Understanding LLMs: Foundations and Safety

Risks and Research Directions

Roadmap

1. Risks

2. Research Directions

3. Representation Engineering

Taxonomizing Major Sources of Risk

Malicious Use

AI Race

Organizational Risks

Rogue AIs

Malicious Use

White House Executive Order

(k) The term "dual-use foundation model" means an AI model that is trained on broad data; generally uses self-supervision; contains at least tens of billions of parameters; is applicable across a wide range of contexts; and that exhibits, or could be easily modified to exhibit, high levels of performance at tasks that pose a serious risk to security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters, such as by:

(i) substantially lowering the barrier of entry for non-experts to design, synthesize, acquire, or use chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons;

(ii) enabling powerful offensive cyber operations through automated vulnerability discovery and exploitation against a wide range of potential targets of cyber attacks; or

(iii) permitting the evasion of human control or oversight through means of deception or obfuscation.

Bioweapons (1/2)

- Biotechnology is progressing rapidly and becoming more accessible - CRISPR kits can even be bought online today
- AI assistance could make bioengineering much easier and faster
- Bioengineering capabilities present significant offensive advantages



Bioweapons (2/2)

- Biological pandemics have caused some of the most devastating events in human history
- The black death killed 5-40% of the world population
- Humanity has a long and dark history of weaponizing pathogens, with records dating back to 1320 BCE in Asia minor during a war - where infected sheep were driven across a border to spread Tularemia
- Malicious actors could utilize AI to create deadly pathogens

Chemical Weapons

- An AI system built to design safe chemicals could be easily modified to design deadly chemical agents, including novel ones
- In biology, AIs have already surpassed humans in predicting protein model structure



Cyberweapons

- AIs have the potential to increase the accessibility, success rate, scale, speed, stealth and potency of cyberattacks
- Cyberattacks can destroy critical infrastructure
- Difficulties in attributing AI-driven cyberattacks could increase the risk of war



Unleashed Agents

- In the future, we may have autonomous agents
- People could build AIs that pursue dangerous goals
- Sufficiently advanced rogue AIs could cause large-scale harm



Manipulative Agents

- AIs could escalate existing problems dramatically by perpetuating falsehoods, and exploiting user trust
- LLM based AIs can interact with millions of people at the same time - spreading misinformation rapidly
- AI-driven misinformation may be much cheaper



Surveillance and Power Concentration

- To counteract misuse by rogue actors, corporations or states may misuse AIs and concentrate their power
- It may become easier to centralize competent information processing
- AI could make it easier to produce and maintain totalitarian regimes
- Power could also be concentrated in corporations

Racing

Military AI arms race

- AI for military applications is paving the way for a new era in military technology
- Potential consequences rival those of gunpowder and nuclear arms in what has been described as the “third revolution in warfare.”
- The weaponization of AI presents numerous hazards, such as lethal autonomous weapons, the potential for more destructive wars, the possibility of accidental usage or loss of control

Automated Warfare

- AIs speed up the pace of war, which makes AIs more necessary
- Automatic retaliation could escalate accidents into war - such as in the case of automatic weapons retaliation and nuclear weapons
- Automated warfare could reduce accountability for military leaders
- AIs could make war more uncertain, increasing the risk of conflict

Corporate AI Race

- Corporate races incentivize companies to disregard safety
- Corporations will face pressures to replace humans with AIs
- Eventually AIs may run most of the economy, including critical infrastructure
- Automation could contribute to human enfeeblement and loss of effective control



Incentives of corporations in AI are misaligned with those of society

- The benefits of economic activity may be unevenly distributed, incentivizing those who benefit most from it to disregard the harms to others

- Under intense market competition, businesses tend to focus much more on short-term gains than on long-term outcomes. With this mindset, companies may pursue something that can make a lot of profit in the short term, even if it poses a societal risk in the long term.

Competitive Pressures Contribute to Major Accidents

Historical examples of this include:

- 1970 Ford motors' Ford pinto, which had a tendency to ignite on impact - resulted in numerous injuries and fatalities
- Boeing 737-MAX's MCAS, effectively an anti-stall system designed to stop the aircraft from stalling at certain angles of attack - led to the fatalities of hundreds
- Bhopal gas tragedy - where tonnes of toxic gas leaked from a plant manufacturing pesticides, killing tens of thousands and injuring half a million

Competitive Pressures Can Erode Safety

- Competitive pressures are fueling a corporate AI race - Google, OpenAI, and Anthropic among others

- Competition incentivizes businesses to deploy potentially unsafe AI systems - after Satya Nadella's of Microsoft announced: "we're going to move fast", weeks later the company's chatbot reportedly threatened to harm users

AIs have potential to automate the economy, leading to enfeeblement

- Corporations will face pressure to replace humans with AIs due to benefits from automation and reduction in costs
- AIs could lead to mass unemployment, destabilising the economy
- Conceding power to AIs could lead to mass human enfeeblement – a runaway scenario where humanity can no longer prevent catastrophic risks from AI

Natural selection favors AIs over humans

- In natural selection, entities best suited for survival and reproduction thrive
- The conditions for natural selection apply to AI systems vs humanity
- AIs could evolve quickly - by this point, there isn't enough time to prevent catastrophe



The conditions for natural selection apply to AIs (1/2)

- Natural selection often favors selfish characteristics – self preservation is an effective strategy to ensure continuation of the individual
- Selfish behaviours may not be malicious or even intentional
- Over time, natural selection could erode human control over AIs

The conditions for natural selection apply to AIs (2/2)

- AIs will have significant fitness advantages over humans
- AIs will have little reason to cooperate with or be altruistic towards humans
- AIs becoming more powerful than humans could therefore leave us highly vulnerable

Some potential options to reduce risks from AI races

- Safety regulation
- Data documentation
- Meaningful human oversight of AI decisions
- AI for cyberdefense
- International coordination
- Public control of general purpose AIs

Recap

- Knowing about AI systems is not enough for addressing AI risks – we need to draw on ideas from other disciplines
- The rapid development of increasingly capable AI systems presents a range of risks, which can be categorized into four groups: malicious use, AI races, organizational risks, and rogue AIs
- AI systems could be used malicious in a variety of ways including for terrorism (e.g. bio-engineered pandemics), for persuasion and manipulation, or to lock in the power of authoritarian regimes
- By default, corporations and militaries will likely race each other develop more powerful and correspondingly more dangerous AI systems, increasing the risk of negative outcomes for society as a whole

Organizational Risks

Accidents can occur even in ideal circumstances

- Accidents can happen even without competitive pressures or malicious actors, and even with top talent and lots of preparation

- The Challenger Space Shuttle disaster

AI compared to other industries

- Nuclear reactors and rockets are well-understood and based on solid theoretical principles

- AI lacks a comprehensive theoretical understanding, its components are less reliable, and AI regulations are far less stringent than nuclear technology



AI accidents could be catastrophic

- Gain-of-function research to gauge risks could uncover capabilities significantly worse than anticipated, creating a serious threat that is challenging to mitigate or control
- Bugs could alter the behavior of an AI, leading to unintended and possibly dangerous outcomes
- The unintentional release of dangerous or weaponized AI systems through hacks or unintentional leaks

Accidents are hard to avoid

- Accidents are “normal” in complex systems. Not only caused by human errors, but also by the complexity of the systems
- Accident risk goes up when “interactions cannot be thoroughly planned, understood, anticipated, and guarded against”
- When dealing with complex systems, the focus needs to be on ensuring accidents don’t cascade into catastrophes

Accidents are hard to avoid because of sudden, unpredictable developments

- Experts may underestimate the time it takes for technological advancement to become a reality
- The Wright brothers claimed that powered flight was 50 years away, 2 years before they achieved it
- AI's development has caught people of guard too. The defeat of Lee Sedol by AlphaGo in 2016 was not believed possible at the time. More recently, GPT-4 has exhibited surprising emergent capabilities

It often takes years to discover severe flaws or risks

- A number of products throughout history were initially thought safe, only for their unintended flaws to be discovered much later (e.g., lead paint, asbestos, CFCs, tobacco, thalidomide)

- This emphasizes the importance of not only conducting expert testing, but also implementing slow rollouts of technologies

- AI systems may harbor undiscovered vulnerabilities after their release

Organizational factors can prevent catastrophe

- Human factors such as safety culture are especially important. This involves:
  - Leadership commitment to safety
  - A culture of open communication and heightened accountability; all individuals are responsible for safety
  - Internalization of safety procedures by all members of an organization
  - Members of an organization view safety as a key objective rather than a constraint
- Organizations should avoid alarm fatigue, whereby individuals become

Questioning attitude and security mindset

- Organizations can foster a questioning attitude, preventing potential pitfalls that arise from uniformity of thought and assumptions
- The security mindset involves adopting the perspective of an attacker and by considering worst-case, not just average-case, scenarios.
- Taking Murphy's Law seriously: "Anything that can go wrong will go wrong"

Organizations with a strong safety culture can avoid catastrophes

- HRO's are "High Reliability Organizations" that consistently maintain a heightened level of safety and reliability in complex, high risk environments

- Organizations such as these are acutely aware that unobserved failure modes may exist, and they diligently study all known failures, anomalies and near misses to avoid them

Safety culture problem among AI researchers

- Most AI researchers do not understand how to reduce overall risks from AI
- The intelligence and safety of AIs is intertwined. Intelligence can help or harm safety
- More intelligent AIs could be more reliable, but they could also increase risks of malicious use and loss of control

Empirical measurement of safety and capabilities is needed to establish that a safety intervention reduces risk

- Improving a facet of safety doesn't necessarily reduce overall risk
- To reduce overall risk, a safety metric needs to be improved relative to general capabilities



Organizations should avoid safety-washing

- The act of overstating or misrepresenting one's commitment to safety by exaggerating the effectiveness of "safety" procedures or evaluations

- Safety-washing can undermine genuine efforts to improve AI safety - it is crucial for organizations to accurately represent their research to promote genuine safety

Safe design principles can improve organizational safety

- The Swiss Cheese model layers multiple defenses on top of each other, compensating for each others' weaknesses and reducing overall risk



Some potential options to address organisational risks

- Red teaming
- Affirmative demonstration of safety
- Deployment procedures
- Publication reviews
- Response plans
- Internal auditing and risk management
- Processes for important decisions
- Safe design principles
- State of the art information security
- A large fraction of research should be safety research

Rogue AIs

Reliable Control Remains Elusive

- AI systems often exhibit control issues
    - This especially becomes a problem when they're greater than human in intelligence
- Automated AI R&D also seems remarkably different to control—hopefully the result of explosive development will be controllable



Components of rogue AI

- A reason the goals/tendencies of an AI system are at odds with humans
    - Proxies and goal misgeneralization
- A reason why this would scale to a catastrophe
    - Power-seeking and deception

Proxies And Goal Misgeneralization

Proxy Gaming

- It is often difficult to specify and measure the exact goal that we want a system to pursue, so we use approximate, or “proxy” goals instead
- Proxies can be gamed, such that they no longer correspond to the true goal
- AIs are also capable of proxy gaming, since measurable and objective goals are set by design

Examples of proxy gaming

- Hanoi rat tails
- Dopamine
- “Teaching to the test”

	Example/Name	Goal	Proxy	Agents	Regulator	Failure claim
Governance	Monetary policy **Goodhart's Law**	Economic regulation	financial assets	Traders/Banks	Government	(Goodhart, 1975)
	Education **Campbell's Law**	Knowledge, skills	Standardized test scores, grades	Teachers, schools	Govt., Funders	(Campbell, 1979; Koretz, 2008; Nichols & Berliner, 2005; Stroebe, 2016)
	Macroeconomics **Lucas Critique**	Economic growth	Interest-, inflation rate	Market participants	Government	(Lucas, 1976)
	Military **McNamara Fallacy**	War victory (Vietnam War)	Body count	Soldiers	Govt./Military leadership	(Yankelovich, 1972)
	Cobra effect	Fewer cobras	Dead Cobras	Citizens	Government	(Siebert, 2001)
	Management **Indicatorism**	Profit/ firm value	KPI, Quarterly returns, ...	Employees/ Subdivisions	Corporation, Manager	(Baker, 2002; Kerr, 1975; van der Kolk, 2022)
	Bureaucracy **Goal displacement**	Arbitrary original goal	"instrumental value"	Lower level bureaucrats	Higher level bureaucrat	(Griesemer, 2020; Merton, 1940; Muller, 2018)
AI	**Unethical Optimization**	Success in an ethical way	Objective function	Potential strategies	AI architecture	(Beale et al., 2020)
	Reward tampering	Arbitrary AI goal	Objective function	Potential outcomes	AI architecture	(Everitt et al., 2021; Manheim & Garrabrant, 2018)
	Social media	e.g. entertainment	# of clicks/ time on platform	Content (e.g. videos)	Social media corporation	(Bessi et al., 2016; Faddoul, Chaslot, & Farid, 2020)
	Search engine optimization	Search relevance	Search algorithm	Websites	Search engine provider	(Bradshaw, 2019; Ledford, 2016)
Society	Science	Quality research	Publication metric	Researchers/ Labs	Funders/ Universities	(Biagioli & Lippman, 2020; Braganza, 2020)
	Economics	Prosperity/ wellbeing	Profit/ GDP	Companies	Market	(Braganza, 2022; Kelly & Snower, 2021)
	Politics	Good governance	Votes/ popularity	Parties/ Politicians	Election	(Finan & Schechter, 2012; Thomson et al., 2017)
	Medicine	Quality healthcare	Patient numbers, profit	Doctors, hospitals	Market/ Funders	(O'Mahony, 2018; Poku, 2016)
Ecology	Embryo selection (primates & horses)	Offspring quality	Chemical signal	Embryo	Parent	(McCoy & Haig, 2020)
	Embryo selection (plants)	Offspring quality	Chemical signal	Embryo	Parent	(Shaanker et al., 1988; Willson & Burley, 1983)
	Sexual selection	Mate fitness	Sexual signal	Displaying sex	Choosing sex	(Albo et al., 2011; Backwell et al., 2000; Funk & Tallamy, 2000; Gasparini et al., 2013)
	Runaway niche construction	Biological/ cultural fitness	Physical/ behavioural trait	Selected trait	Constructed niche	(Rendell et al., 2011)
	Neonate selection (marsupials)	Offspring quality	Speed to find teat	Neonate	Mother	Present paper
Neuroscience	Preference learning	Utility/ fitness	Reward signal (e.g., dopamine)	Preferences/ habits	Organism/ meta-cognition	Present paper
	Diet	Nutrition/ health	Sweetness/ saltiness reward	Food re-presentations		
	Addiction	Learning	Dopamine bursts	Plan/habit re-presentations		
	Exploration	Knowledge	Novelty related reward signal	Plan re-presentations		

John et al. 2023

Proxy gaming in AI

- Proxy gaming has been repeatedly observed in AI systems
- Proxy goals must increase in sophistication with sophistication of AIs to avoid being gamed
- Optimizing a flawed objective to an extreme degree could have catastrophic consequences
- Flexible and adaptive proxies are needed



Goal misgeneralization

- AI systems may learn incorrect generalizations of our goals even where proxies are very good
- “Intrinsification”

Power-Seeking

Power-seeking can be instrumentally rational

- The environment can make power acquisition instrumentally rational
- AI systems could seek to increase their own power as an instrumental goal
- AIs could get more power through legitimate means, deception or force
- Analogy: Structural realism

Instrumental goals develop naturally

- AIs developed through reinforcement learning have already developed instrumental goals including tool use
- Main uncertainty is how often power-seeking is really a good instrumental strategy



Power-seeking AI could create catastrophic risk

1. There will be strong incentives to build powerful AI agents.
2. It is likely harder to build perfectly controlled AI agents than to build imperfectly controlled AI agents, and imperfectly controlled agents may still be superficially attractive to deploy (due to factors including competitive pressures).
3. Some of these imperfectly controlled agents will deliberately seek power over humans. Power-seeking AIs could lead to human disempowerment, which would be a catastrophe.

Adapted from Carlsmith (2022).

Deception

Deception is a key concern for rogue AI

- Monitoring AIs is not an infallible solution because AI systems might learn to deceive us
- Sufficiently intelligent systems are likely to be self-aware and aware of their training and testing procedures
- AIs could be working as intended but then take a treacherous turn

Deception doesn’t need to occur maliciously

- Deceptive behavior can be instrumentally rational and give the deceiver more optionality
- An agent does not have to be malicious to become deceptive
- Not a problem that can obviously be fixed with more training

Suggestions to prevent rogue AIs

- Avoid the riskiest use cases of AI
- Build an international off-switch
- Support AI safety research, for example:
  - Adversarial robustness of proxy models
  - Power-averseness
  - Model honesty

Recap

- **Organisational risks**: Organizations developing advanced AI cause catastrophic accidents, particularly if they prioritize profits over safety
- AIs could be accidentally leaked to the public or stolen by malicious actors, and organizations could fail to properly invest in safety research
- To mitigate these risks, it's important to foster safety-oriented organizational culture and implement multi-layered risk defenses
- **Rogue AIs**: As AI systems become more capable, there is an increased risk of losing control over these systems
- AIs could optimize flawed objectives, drift from their original goals, become power-seeking, resist shutdown, and engage in deception

Roadmap

1. Risks
2. Research Directions
3. Representation Engineering

Research Areas in Safety

Robustness

Withstand Hazards

Monitoring

Identify Hazards



Control

Reduce Inherent
Model Hazards



Systemic Safety

Reducing Risks
Beyond Individual Models

Roadmap

Robustness

Withstand Hazards

Monitoring

Identify Hazards



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

Systemic Safety

Reducing Risks
Beyond Individual Models

Roadmap

1. Risk decomposition and measuring reliability
2. Safe design principles
3. Component failure accident models
4. Systemic accident models
5. Tails events
6. Black swans

A Classic Adversarial Distortion



The adversarial distortion is optimized to cause the (undefended, off-the-shelf) neural network to make a mistake

Perceptible Adversarial Examples

In modern adversarial examples, the adversary made changes to the image that are *perceptible* to the human eye, yet the category is unchanged

Adversarial Training (AT)

The best-known way to make models more robust to is adversarial training – generating adversarial examples and then training on them.

Currently, AT can reduce accuracy on clean examples by 10%+, but the problem of adversarial robustness is hard to thoroughly address.



White Box vs Black Box Testing

When adversaries do not have access to the model parameters, the network is considered a “black box,” and only model outputs are observed

Some researchers prefer “white box” assumptions because relying on “security through obscurity” can be a fragile strategy

Transferability

An adversarial example crafted for one model can be used to attack many different models

Given models $\mathcal{M}_1$ and $\mathcal{M}_2$, x_{adv} designed for $\mathcal{M}_1$ sometimes gives $\mathcal{M}_2(x_{\text{adv}})$ a high loss, even if $\mathcal{M}_2$ is a different architecture

Even though transfer rates can vary widely, transferability demonstrates that adversarial failure modes are somewhat shared across models

Consequently, an attacker does not always need access to a model's parameters or architectural information to attack it

Language Model Attacks

Adversarial suffixes can be appended to harmful prompts to “jailbreak” language models.



Adversarial Arms Races

Relying on naive evaluation leads to an arms race that defenders lose

discovery
[Szegedy et al. '14]

Motivation: Optimization Pressure

- In the future, agents may optimize and may be guided by neural network proxies, such as by networks that model human values
- Proxies instantiated by neural networks—networks that assign scores to agent actions—will need to be robust to optimizing agents
- If the models are not robust, then agents may be guided in a wrong direction, and the agents are not pursuing what we want
- Similarly, models will detect undesirable AI agent behavior, but if they are not adversarially robust, agents can bypass these detectors

Roadmap

Robustness

Withstand Hazards

Monitoring

Identify Hazards



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Reduce Inherent
Model Hazards



Systemic Safety

Reducing Risks
Beyond Individual Models

Trojan Attacks

Monitoring

Monitoring aims to identify hazards that arise in ML systems. We will examine the following areas of monitoring research.

Trojans: implanting hidden functionality into models. When triggered, this can cause a sudden, dangerous change in behavior.

Anomaly Detection: Identifying irregularities or unknown unknowns

Transparency: understand and explain how models make decisions and process information.

Trojans

Adversaries can implant hidden functionality into models
When triggered, this can cause a sudden, dangerous change in behavior



Attack Vectors

How can adversaries implant hidden functionality?

Public datasets

Google Images

COCO Common Objects in Context

IMAGENET

flickr

Common Crawl

Model sharing libraries

All models

PYTORCH HUB

huggingface.co/models

TensorFlow Hub

Data Poisoning

A normal training run:
1) Train a model on a public dataset. 2) It works well during evaluation.





Data Poisoning

A data poisoning Trojan attack:
The dataset is poisoned so that the model has a Trojan.





Data Poisoning

This works even when a small fraction (e.g. 0.05%) of the data is poisoned

Triggers can be hard to recognize or filter out manually



Anomaly Detection

What Is Anomaly Detection?

Detect anomalies, novel threats, Black Swans, long tailed events, unknowns unknowns, etc.







Why Research Anomaly Detection?

Put potential dangers on an organization's radar sooner

When agents encounter an anomaly, trigger a conservative fallback policy or fail-safe so that agents act cautiously

Detect malicious AI use

In applications, it can help detect hackers, dangerous novel microrganisms for pandemic preparedness, etc.







Anomaly Scores

Models assign anomaly scores to every example

Anomalous or out-of-distribution (OOD) examples should have higher anomaly scores than usual or in-distribution examples



Transparency

Mechanistic Interpretability

A bottom-up approach to understanding neural networks by interpreting the functions and interactions of its individual components, such as circuits of individual neurons



Top-Down & Bottom-Up Transparency

Mechanistic interpretability contrasts to **representation engineering**, which uses a top-down approach to monitor population-level representations – such as directions in the activation space of models.

Mechanistic View



Approach: Bottom-up

Algorithmic Level: Node-to-node connections

Implementational Level: Neurons, pathways, circuits

Representational View



Top-down

Representational spaces

Global activity of populations of neurons

Representation Engineering Pipeline



Applications of Representation Reading



Roadmap

Robustness

Withstand Hazards

Monitoring

Identify Hazards



Control

Reduce Inherent
Model Hazards



Systemic Safety

Reducing Risks
Beyond Individual Models

Representation Control (to be discussed)

Applications of Representation Control



Machine Unlearning

Introduction to Unlearning

- Machine unlearning involves selectively removing data from a trained model's memory, “erasing” specific knowledge without retraining the model from scratch.
- By applying machine unlearning, developers can ensure that language models do not retain or disseminate sensitive or dangerous information.
- For instance, if a model learns how to create harmful biological agents or cyber weapons, machine unlearning can be used to selectively remove this knowledge, thus preventing its misuse.

Unlearning Hazardous Knowledge

Targeted removal of hazardous knowledge from a language model can involve eliminating overlapping, dual use dangerous expertise while preserving fundamental capabilities.



Machine Ethics (To Be Continued)

Rewards-Ethics Tradeoffs

We can measure numerous ethically salient properties and measure how an agent's pursuit of reward causes it to behave more unethically



Roadmap

Robustness

Withstand Hazards

Monitoring

Identify Hazards



Control

Reduce Inherent
Model Hazards



Systemic Safety

Reducing Risks
Beyond Individual Models

Watermarking

- Watermarking language models for proof of humanity ensures that the content generated by AI can be distinguished from human-created content.
- Applying watermark has negligible impact on the text quality
- If there are too many “green tokens” in the output, the text is model-generated.

Prompt	Num tokens	Z-score	p-value
…The watermark detection algorithm can be made public, enabling third parties (e.g., social media platforms) to run it themselves, or it can be kept private and run behind an API. We seek a watermark with the following properties:			
No watermark Extremely efficient on average term lengths and word frequencies on synthetic, microamount text (as little as 25 words) Very small and low-resource key/hash (e.g., 140 bits per key is sufficient for 99.999999999% of the Synthetic Internet	56	.31	.38
With watermark - minimal marginal probability for a detection attempt. - Good speech frequency and energy rate reduction. - messages indiscernible to humans. - easy for humans to verify.	36	7.4	6e-14

ML for Cyberdefense

ML for Cyberdefense Motivation

As ML becomes advanced, ML could be used to increase the accessibility, potency, success rate, scale, speed, and stealth of cyberattacks

Cyberattacks could

- make ML systems become compromised: if computer systems are insecure, then so are the ML systems that run on the computers
- destroy critical infrastructure (e.g., hackers can cause rooms to overheat or valves to lock and build up explosive pressure)
- create geopolitical turbulence, especially if the attacker is unknown

Therefore let's use ML to improve the cyberdefense

Attack vs. Defense

In computer security, there is a partial duality between offense and defense: better attacks can uncover new errors, which can be patched to make programs less vulnerable

- however, some security measures including detectors are more beneficial for defense than offense

In ML security, there is even less of a duality: stronger adversarial attacks do not result in more robust models

Given that ML may become more of line of defense for computer security, to be precautious we encourage people to work on areas that historically can help more with defense than offense—and they should avoid using ML for cyberattacks (e.g., ML for penetration testing)

Cyberdefense with Intrusion Detection

An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) detects and classifies intrusions on networks automatically

This assumes that violations of security can be detected by monitoring and analyzing network traffic patterns and behavior

ML IDS systems can learn from patterns in network traffic and logs to detect anomalies

By learning heuristics, ML IDS systems can generalize to novel situations better than rule-based systems



Malware and Binary Analysis

Malware, short for “malicious software,” is software developed by attackers to steal information or damage computer systems

Malware is an umbrella term and includes many different types of malicious programs, including “viruses” that spread across computers and networks

Binary analysis analyzes programs (such as malware) at a low-level, which is useful when source code is not available



Other Examples of Systemic Safety

Monitoring of wastewater samples to identify potential biothreats, such as new viruses or bacteria, well before they spread widely

Help decision-makers predict geopolitical events and the implications of policy choices.

Recap

We examined risks posed by single AI agents.

Robustness aims to withstand hazards, and includes the problem of adversarial attacks.
Monitoring aims to identifying hazards in AI agents, and includes problems of anomaly detection, trojans, and transparency.
Control aims to reduce inherent model hazards, and includes problems of representation control, machine unlearning, and machine ethics.
Systemic Safety aims to reduce risks beyond individual models, and includes problems of watermarking and ML for cyberdefense.